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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether top-tier M&A investment bankers (financial advisors) 
create value for acquirers with different financial conditions in both the short and long 
term via analyzing 3420 US deals during 1990–2012. In this paper, deals are divided 
into three groups based on acquirer financial constraints – acquisitions by constrained, 
neutral and unconstrained firms. We find that the effects of top-tier bankers are 
dependent on acquirer financial conditions. Specifically, top-tier advisors improve 
performance for constrained acquirers rather than neutral, and unconstrained acquirers. 
Our results show that top-tier investment bankers improve constrained acquirers’ 
short- (5 days) and long-term (36 months) performance by 1.45% and 24.27% 
respectively, after controlling for firm, deal and market characteristics. For deals with 
investment banker involvement, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
have the lowest deal completion rate, and pay the lowest bid premiums; while 
unconstrained acquirers that retain top-tier investment bankers have the highest deal 
completion rate, and pay relatively high bid premiums. Our findings imply that 
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constrained acquirers tend to retain top-tier investment bankers to gain superior 
synergy, while unconstrained acquirers appear to retain top-tier investment bankers to 
ensure the deal completion. 
 
JEL Classification: G14; G34. 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Investment Banker; Financial constraint; Firm 
performance. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether the effects of investment banker reputation on 
acquirer performance vary according to acquirer financial conditions. Mergers and 
acquisitions are one of the most influential investment projects for companies. 
Majority of acquirers and targets will retain investment bankers as their financial 
advisors. For acquisitions with advisors’ involvement, about 50% of the deals are 
advised by top-tier investment bankers.1 The effects of bank reputation on acquirer 
performance has been highlighted by an increasing number of researchers. 
Top-tier investment bankers charge much higher advisory fees and are supposed to 
provide their clients with superior service (Golubov et al., 2012). However, the 
empirical evidence on this reputation–quality mechanism remains inconclusive. Some 
studies find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform those 
advised by non-top-tier advisors and may even obtain negative abnormal returns (e.g. 
Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996).  
For example, Michel et al. (1991) find that Drexel Burnham Lambert, one of the less 
prestigious banks, helps its clients earn the highest announcement abnormal returns, 
while First Boston, Bulge Bracket, achieves the poorest performance. In other words, 
bank reputation does not relate to better takeover performance. Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) show that acquirer announcement returns do not differ across in-house deals 
and deals advised by investment banks. The differences in announcement returns 
between acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are also insignificant. 
                                                                
1 Source: Thomson One Banker. 
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Rau (2000) finds that acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks obtain higher 
announcement abnormal returns in tender offers but lower announcement abnormal 
returns in mergers compared to acquirers advised by lower-tier investment banks. 
Furthermore, in both mergers and tender offers advised by top-tier investment banks, 
the completion rate of value-increasing transactions measured by announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is not significantly higher than that of value-
decreasing transactions. In contrast, compared to the proportion of tender offers with 
negative announcement CARs, second-tier banks help acquirers complete a 
significantly higher proportion of tender offers with positive announcement CARs. 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) use a unique method employing the difference between the 
transaction values at the announcement date and the effective date as a proxy for 
acquisition gains, and suggest that acquisition gains are inversely associated with the 
retention of top-tier investment bankers. Furthermore, Ismail (2010) reports that 
acquirers advised by first-tier banks obtain negative announcement returns, whereas 
second-tier banks help their clients gain positive returns around announcements. 
In contrast, several researchers argue that top-tier advisors have superior abilities to 
identify synergistic targets and secure a larger proportion of synergy for their clients. 
Therefore, top-tier advisors are capable of improving acquirer performance (Golubov 
et al., 2012). Additionally, a higher reputation is associated with a higher market 
share. To maintain this market share, top-tier advisors must therefore maintain their 
reputation, which is achieved by providing superior service.  
Specifically, Boone and Mulherin (2008) find that acquirer announcement returns are 
positively related to top-tier advisors retained by acquirers but negatively related to 
top-tier advisors retained by targets. Therefore, top-tier advisors help their acquirer 
clients improve acquisition performance, and help their target clients gain high-
premium offers. In other words, the retention of top-tier advisors is in the interest of 
employers. In addition, Golubov et al. (2012) argue that acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors in public acquisitions. 
The authors find that the retention of top-tier advisors led to $65.83 million 
shareholder gains for acquirers, on average, in public acquisitions during 1996–2009. 
More importantly, their results suggest that the improvement in performance can be 
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attributed to top-tier advisors’ skills in identifying synergistic targets and negotiating 
higher shares of synergies for acquirers. 
Previous literature examines the effects of investment bankers’ reputation on acquirer 
performance. However, a firm’s decisions to conduct acquisitions and to retain top-
tier advisors can be influenced by firm characteristics, such as firms’ financial 
conditions. Acquirers with sufficient internal funds are more likely to conduct 
mergers, while they tend to forgo mergers if they are financially constrained (Jensen, 
1986; Harford, 1999). At the same time, cash-rich acquirers are more likely to retain 
top-tier advisors (Golubov et al., 2012).  
Jensen (1986) introduces the free cash flow hypothesis and argues that firms with 
excess cash reserves tend to make value-decreasing takeover deals. Similarly, Smith 
and Kim (1994) investigate the influence of free cash flow and financial slack on 
announcement abnormal returns. Their study shows that acquirers with high free cash 
flow obtain significantly negative announcement abnormal returns, whereas slack-
poor acquirers gain significantly positive announcement abnormal returns. The returns 
to acquirers are highest in the acquisition of high free cash flow targets by slack-poor 
acquirers. In addition, Harford (1999) examines whether excess cash holdings 
stimulate top management to conduct takeover transactions and whether such deals 
(made by cash-rich acquirers) tend to destroy value. The author finds that cash 
richness is positively related to the probability of being an acquirer, but negatively 
related to acquirer announcement returns. Additionally, the post-merger long-term 
abnormal operating performance of both cash-rich and cash-poor acquirers is 
significantly negative and insignificant, respectively. In other words, cash-rich 
companies tend to conduct value-destroying takeovers. Furthermore, Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, 2008) find that financially unconstrained firms are more likely to exhibit 
overconfidence and overconfident CEOs tend to conduct value-destroying 
acquisitions, while firms with financial constraints are reluctant to raise external 
capital and forgo mergers if external finance is required. 
Above-mentioned studies suggest that acquirers with different financial conditions 
exhibit different behaviors, which may help to explain the inconclusive evidence on 
the role of top-tier investment bankers in M&A deals. Specifically, acquirers with 
abundant cash flows tend to overestimate their ability to generate excess returns 
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(Croci et al., 2010; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 
1986). Thus, it is highly possible that they do not rely on investment bankers to 
identify synergistic targets, and employ top-tier advisors solely to complete their 
intended M&A deals. In contrast, acquirers with financial constraints do not have 
sufficient internal funds to finance M&A deals, and high financing costs force 
constrained firms to make acquisition decision rationally and carefully. Consequently, 
constrained acquirers are likely to retain top-tier advisors to obtain acquisition 
synergy. However, there is no empirical research has directly examined whether the 
effects of top-tier investment bankers differ across acquirers with different financial 
conditions. This paper, therefore, aims to fill this void in the literature. Specifically, 
we examine acquirer short- and long-term performance and, more importantly, 
investigate whether the effects of top-tier advisors are dependent on acquirer financial 
conditions.  
Therefore, we analyze a large sample of US M&As over the 1990–2012 period, and 
divide the deals into three groups – acquisitions by constrained, neutral, and 
unconstrained acquirers. Specifically, we use KZ index to classify acquirer financial 
constraints. The lowest (highest) one third of acquirers ranked by their KZ index are 
defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle one third of acquirers 
are classified as neutral acquirers. 2 We use market share-based league table to 
measure investment banker reputation. Specifically, top-10 investment banks on the 
league table are defined as top-tier advisors, while others are defined as non-top-tier 
advisors. 3  We show that top-tier investment bankers help financially constrained 
acquirers improve performance in both the short and long term. By contrast, the 
effects of top-tier investment bankers are insignificant for unconstrained and neutral 
acquirers, which is consistent with most of previous literature. 4  For deals with 
investment banker involvement, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
gain highest short- and long-term abnormal returns, and pay lowest bid premiums, 
while unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have highest deal 
completion rate. These results suggest that constrained acquirers retain top-tier 
advisors to improve takeover performance and bargaining power, while unconstrained 
                                                                
2 We also use SA Index to measure acquirer financial constraint as the robustness check. Acquirers with higher SA 
Index are more constrained. Robustness tests are discussed in Section 4. 
3 Investment bank league tables are acquired from Thomson One Banker. We also use other classifications to 
define top-tier advisors. Robustness tests are discussed in Section 4. 
4 See Hunter and Jagtiani (2003); Ismail (2010); Michel et al. (1991); Rau (2000); Servaes and Zenner (1996). 
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acquirers advised top-tier advisors give priority to deal completion. In other words, 
the effects of top-tier advisors are dependent on acquirer financial conditions.   
This research contributes to the M&A literature in the following two aspects. First, 
this paper sheds new light on puzzling empirical evidence on the effects of top-tier 
investment bankers. We highlight that the effects of top-tier advisors are sensitive to 
acquirer financial conditions. By examining abnormal returns to acquirers in different 
advisor–constraint groups, we provide novel evidence on the impact of top-tier 
advisors on acquirer performance. In particular, we find that top-tier advisors create 
value for their clients, but only if their clients are financially constrained acquirers.  
Second, this paper emphasizes the importance of long-term effects of financial 
advisors. Most studies 5  only focus on investment bankers’ effects on acquirer 
performance in the short term. However, financial advisors engage in not only deal 
negotiation but also post-deal integration. If the synergies identified and secured by 
top-tier advisors exist, then it will take time to transfer them into improved 
performance through post-deal integration and to demonstrate them to the market. To 
fill this void in research, this paper investigates the effects of advisors on acquirer 
performance in both the short and long term.  
Our findings also have important strategic implications for practitioners. Prestigious 
investment bankers have superior abilities to improve their clients bargaining power 
and takeover performance. They also have stronger skills in deal completion. 
However, our research suggests whether top-tier bankers can fulfill their potential is 
determine by clients’ aims. We emphasize that the positive effects of top-tier 
investment bankers can be offset by acquirers’ overconfidence. Stock markets reward 
acquirers who make acquisition decisions rationally and elaborately.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
selection procedure and methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. 
Robustness tests are carried out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
                                                                
5 See Bao and Edmans (2011); Bowers and Miller (1990); da Silva Rosa et al. (2004); Golubov et al. (2012); 
Ismail (2010); Kale et al. (2003); McLaughlin (1992); Michel et al. (1991); Schiereck et al. (2009); Servaes and 
Zenner (1996); Walter et al. (2008).    
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2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Sample selection 
This paper analyzes a sample of US domestic M&As announced over the 1st January 
1990 – 31st December 2012. Initially, we acquire a sample of 28220 deals from 
Thomson One Banker.6 Since this paper focuses on the effects of investment bankers, 
acquirers are required to have their advisor information recorded by Thomson One 
Banker, yielding 6782 deals. To control for deal characteristics, observations are 
required report transaction value and payment method information to Thomson One 
Banker, which leaves a sample of 5910 deals. To calculate short- and long-term 
abnormal returns, acquirers are required to file sufficient stock price data with the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, which leaves a sample of 
5505 deals.7 To measure financial constraints and other firm characteristics, acquirers 
are required to have sufficient accounting data in the Compustat database, yielding a 
final sample of 3420 deals.8 In the final sample, 3323 transactions are advised by 
investment banks, and 97 transactions are in-house deals.  
2.2. Methodology 
Measure of advisor reputation 
Following the method of Golubov et al. (2012), this research uses a binary 
classification to distinguish between top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. Specifically, 
the top 10 banks measured by transaction value are classified as top-tier advisors and 
the others are classified as non-top-tier advisors9. Since the eighth and tenth advisors 
are very similar in transaction values and market shares, this paper uses the top 10 as 
the cut-off point, unlike the top-eight classification of Golubov et al. (2012).  
                                                                
6 The original sample includes 203,415 deals. Acquirers are required to be public and targets are required to be 
public, private, or subsidiaries. A subsidiary firm is a separate company controlled by a parent company. Large 
public firms always own small private subsidiaries. Therefore, subsidiaries are included, independent on whether 
they are public or private. Using these criteria yields a sample of 105,565 deals. Takeover transaction values are 
required to be greater than or equal to $1 million, yielding a sample of 58,742 deals. Regulated industries such as 
financial and utility firms (Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, respectively) are 
excluded, yielding a sample of 41,396 deals. Bankruptcy acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged 
buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatizations are excluded from the 
sample, leaving a sample of 28,220 observations. 
7 Calculating size-adjusted BHARs also requires data on the book value of equity from the Compustat database. 
8 This paper uses the KZ index to measure financial constraints. To calculate the KZ index, COMPUSTAT items 1, 
6, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 34, 60, 74, and 216 are required. 
9 Appendix 1 shows the top 25 investment banks ranked by transaction value. Financial advisor league tables were 
downloaded from Thomson One Banker. 
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To prevent misclassification, this paper also pays attention to takeovers among 
investment banks. For instance, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in 2008 and 
was acquired by Barclays Capital the same year. Therefore, deals advised by Barclays 
Capital before the acquisition of Lehman Brothers (top tier) are classified as being 
advised by a non-top-tier investment bank, whereas deals advised by Barclays Capital 
after the acquisition are classified as advised by a top-tier bank. Similarly, First 
Boston (top tier) was acquired by Credit Suisse in 1990. Travelers Group acquired 
Salomon Brothers (top tier) in 1998 and subsequently merged with Citicorp the same 
year, establishing Citigroup.  
Measure of financial constraint 
This paper uses the Kaplan–Zingales (KZ) index to measure acquirer financial 
constraints. Using a sample of 49 low-dividend firms from 1970 to 1984, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) investigate the proper measure of firms’ financial constraints. 
Specifically, they identify constrained and unconstrained firms by analyzing annual 
reports and management discussions. Subsequently, they consider firm characteristics 
(ratio of cash flow to capital, Tobin’s Q, leverage, ratio of dividends to capital, and 
ratio of cash to capital) that relate to financing constraints to estimate an ordered logit 
regression. The parameters of the regression are used to formulate the KZ index, 
thereby measuring a firm’s level of financial constraint (Lamont et al., 2001). A 
higher KZ index indicates a higher level of financial constraint. The KZ index is 
widely used in research to measure firm financial constraints (e.g. Baker et al., 2003; 
Guariglia and Yang, 2016; Li, 2011; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). 
Following the aforementioned research, we calculate the KZ index using the 
following formula: 
               
    
     
                                  
         
           
     
          
   
     
 
where CFit/Kit-1 is cash flow (Compustat item IB+DP) over lagged capital (Compustat 
item PPENT), Qit is Tobin’s Q ratio (Compustat item (AT+PRCC×CSHO-CEQ-
TXDB)/AT), Leverageit is the leverage ratio (Compustat item 
(DLTT+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)); Divendendit/Kit-1 is dividends (Compustat item 
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DVC+DVP) over lagged capital (Compustat item PPENT), and Cit/Kit-1 is cash 
(Compustat item CHE) over lagged capital (Compustat item PPENT).  
We divide acquirers into three groups based on their KZ index. Specifically, the 
lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by KZ index are defined as unconstrained 
(constrained). The middle third of acquirers are classified as neutral acquirers.10 
Short-term performance 
Bouwman et al. (2009) argue that the presence of serial bidders implies that multiple 
takeovers may be announced during the estimation period for the market model, and 
therefore the parameter estimates will be biased. In line with these authors, this paper 
uses market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to measure acquirer short-
term performance. Market-adjusted abnormal returns are defined as 
             
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t.  
Subsequently, market-adjusted CARs are calculated over a [-2, 2] window around 
announcements (CAR[-2, 2]), as follows: 
    ,𝑇1,𝑇2  ∑     
𝑇2
 =𝑇1
. 
Long-term performance 
This paper use buy-and-hold abnormal returns to measure acquirer long-term 
performance in completed deals. Test statistics of long-term market-adjusted 
abnormal returns are misspecified due to rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and 
skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). To address these problems, 
Lyon et al. (1999) and Bouwman et al. (2009) use size-adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) to measure long-term stock performance. Therefore, this 
paper calculates post-merger 36-month size-adjusted BHARs (BHAR36). Specifically, 
size-adjusted BHARs are calculated as follows: 
     ,𝑇1,𝑇2  ∏       
𝑇2
 =𝑇1
 ∏       
𝑇2
 =𝑇1
 
                                                                
10
 Additional results obtained using an alternative methodology of constrained acquirers are discussed 
in Section 4 below. 
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where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and Rpt is the monthly return 
for reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
    
 
 
∑   
 
 = 
 
where Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and N the number of firms.  
In each year, we construct 50 reference portfolios based on size and market-to-book. 
The reference portfolios are created in two stages, following Bouwman et al. (2009). 
First, from 1990 to 2009, all NYSE firms are sorted into deciles on the basis of their 
market value, calculated as the stock price multiplied by the number of common 
shares outstanding in June of year t. Second, within each size decile, firms are sorted 
into quintiles based on their market-to-book ratios, calculated as the market value of 
equity in June of year t divided by the book value of equity in fiscal year t - 1. After 
all NYSE firms are categorized into 50 groups, AMEX and NASDAQ firms are 
placed in their proper reference portfolios based on market value and market-to-book 
ratios. Additionally, firms that conducted acquisitions in year t are excluded from the 
reference portfolios.  
Multivariate analysis 
The variation in acquirer abnormal returns can be explained by multiple variables. 
Multivariate regressions are conducted to examine the effects of top-tier investment 
banks
11
. The following equation is employed to examine the relation between acquirer 
performance and the retention of top-tier investment banks: 
            
                                                 
                                               
                                       
where Performancei is the performance of acquirer i, and it can be either short-term or 
long-term. TopTieri is the key explanatory variable in this research and equals one if 
acquirer i retains a top-tier advisor for the deal. Constrainedi (Unconstrainedi) is a 
dummy that equals one if acquirer i is financially constrained (unconstrained). 
TopTieriConstrainedi (TopTieriUnconstrainedi) is the interaction variable that 
                                                                
11 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2. 
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interacts the TopTieri dummy and Constrainedi (Unconstrainedi) dummy. Firmi 
represents the firm characteristics of acquirer i at the end of fiscal year prior to the 
announcement, including size (LN(MV)), market-to-book ratio (M/B), leverage 
(Leverage), cash flows-to-equity ratio (Cash flows/Equity), pre-deal stock 
performance (RUNUP), risk of stock (Sigma), acquirer takeover experience 
(Experienced Bidder), and whether the acquirer is a serial bidder (Serial Bidder). 
Deali represents the deal characteristics for acquirer i, including relative transaction 
values (Relative Size), target public status (Public), payment method (Cash/Stock), 
deal attitude (Hostile), bid competition (Competing Bid), tender offers (Tender Offer), 
and diversifying deals (Diversification). Marketi represents market characteristics for 
acquirer i, including M&A market heat (M&A Heat Degree) and stock market 
valuation (High/Low Valuation Market).  
We also control for year fixed effects (ft) and industry fixed effects (find.). To minimize 
the influence of outliers, all quantitative variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.12 
2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 exhibits summary statistics for the entire sample.13 In our sample, 48.16% and 
49.01% of deals are advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively. In-
house deals account for only 2.84% of the sample.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows both short- and long-term abnormal returns for acquirers. 
For the full sample, acquirers’ CAR [-2, 2] and BHAR36 average 1.08% and -37.25%, 
respectively. Deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly lower short-
term returns but significantly higher long-term returns for acquirers than deals advised 
by non-top-tier advisors.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents statistics for firm characteristics. The KZ index for 
acquirers averages -14.61 over the sample period (1990–2012). Additionally, 
acquirers that retain top-tier advisors have a higher KZ index than acquirers that retain 
                                                                
12 Results hold when the variables are winsorized at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% 
and 95%. 
13
 All the variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2, where Panels A to D present acquirer 
short- and long-term abnormal returns, acquirer firm characteristics, deal characteristics, and market characteristics, 
respectively. 
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non-top-tier advisors (-11.67 versus -18.12), indicating that acquirers advised by top-
tier advisors are more constrained than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
Furthermore, compared with acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, acquirers that 
retain top-tier advisors tend to be larger firms, glamour firms, firms with higher 
leverage, firms with higher cash flows-to-equity ratio, firms with lower stock 
performance and lower risk, firms with more takeover experienced, and serial bidder. 
Panel C shows the deal characteristics. Top-tier advisors are more likely to be retained 
in acquisitions with higher transaction value but lower relative size, public 
acquisitions, all-cash deals, hostile deals, competing bids, and tender offers. In 
addition, top-tier advisors take more time to complete deals and help their clients pay 
lower bid premiums. Top-tier advisors charge higher advisory fees.  However, when 
the deal value is taken into consideration, acquirer pay lower relative advisory fees in 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. 
Panel D presents the market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is significantly 
negatively related to the retention of top-tier advisors, indicating that acquirers in a 
relatively cold M&A market tend to choose top-tier advisors. In addition, acquirers 
are more likely to choose top-tier advisors when stock market valuations are low or 
neutral.  
The correlation matrix of variables used in regression analyses is shown in Table 2. 
The results show relatively low correlation between most independent variables. In 
particular, the correlation between TopTier dummy and other variables, and the 
correlations between KZ index and other variables are low, suggesting that it is 
unlikely to cause the concern about multicollinearity in regression analyses.  
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Univariate analysis 
Short-term performance 
Table 3 reports the short-term performance (CAR [-2, 2]) for different advisor–
constraint groups and their univariate comparison. 
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Insert Table 3 Here 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the announcement abnormal returns for the sample of deals 
advised by investment banks. On average, constrained acquirers significantly 
outperform unconstrained acquirers by 1.49% (p = 0.000). This result is consistent 
with the free cash flow hypothesis that cash-rich acquirers tend to conduct value-
destroying takeovers (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Kim, 1994).  
Panel B of Table 2 shows that deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly 
positive announcement abnormal returns for constrained acquirers, but significantly 
negative abnormal returns for unconstrained acquirers. For deals advised by top-tier 
advisors, constrained acquirers significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers by 
3.19% (p = 0.000) on average, while median constrained acquirer outperform median 
unconstrained acquirer by 2.06% (p = 0.000). 
Panel C of Table 3 represents the announcement abnormal returns for acquirers 
advised by non-top-tier advisors. The results suggest there is no significant difference 
in abnormal returns between constrained and unconstrained acquirers. These results 
indicate that constrained acquirers do not outperform unconstrained acquirers without 
the services of top-tier advisors. If the free cash flow hypothesis can explain all the 
variation in acquirer short-term performance, constrained acquirers should also 
outperform unconstrained acquirers in deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Our 
results suggest that top-tier advisors play a pivotal role in helping constrained 
acquirers gain superior performance.  
Panel D shows the differences in acquirer announcement abnormal returns between 
deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. For the full sample, acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors underperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors 
by 0.94% (p = 0.003) on average. This result is attributed to unconstrained and neutral 
acquirers. On average, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
significantly underperform unconstrained acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors 
by 2.33% (p = 0.000), while neutral acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
significantly underperform neutral acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors by 
1.43% (p = 0.004). These results are consistent with the previous literature that the 
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retention of top-tier advisors does not lead to outperformance and even has negative 
effects on acquirer returns (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 
1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 1996). In contrast, constrained acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors significantly outperform constrained acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors by 0.83% (p = 0.073), which is consistent with the findings of 
Golubov et al. (2012) that top-tier advisors have superior ability to improve their 
clients’ announcement performance. The above results suggest that the retention of 
top-tier advisors has positive effects on the announcement returns of constrained 
acquirers, but has negative effects on the performance of unconstrained acquirers. In 
other words, the impact of top-tier advisors is sensitive to acquirer financial 
conditions: this sheds new light on the inconclusive evidence regarding this 
reputation–quality mechanism. Additionally, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors gain the highest short-term abnormal returns (2.31%, p = 0.000), whereas 
unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain the lowest abnormal returns 
(-0.88%, p = 0.042). Acquirers with different financial conditions have different aims 
and show different behaviors (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). These results suggest that 
constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance, whereas 
unconstrained acquirers that retain top-tier advisors do not give priority to takeover 
gains.  
Long-term performance 
Table 4 reports the long-term performance (BHAR36) for different constraint–advisor 
groups and their univariate comparison.
14
 Long-term abnormal returns are 
significantly negative for each constraint–advisor group, which is consistent with 
previous research (Bouwman et al., 2009). However, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
suggest overvalued acquirers gain profits through acquisitions of undervalued targets, 
although long-term abnormal returns are negative, since acquirers will gain more 
negative returns without acquisitions.  
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
Panels A to C represent acquirer long-term size-adjusted BHARs for the sample of 
completed deals advised by investment banks, deals advised by top-tier advisors, and 
                                                                
14 This paper only measures acquirer long-term performance for completed deals. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 15 
deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, respectively. For the full sample, constrained 
acquirers significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers by 12.44% (p = 0.001) on 
average. Similarly, for deals advised by top-tier advisors, constrained acquirers 
significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers by 17.12% (p = 0.001) on average. 
For deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, median constrained acquirer outperform 
median unconstrained acquirer by 4.91% (p = 0.064). The results concur with the free 
cash flow hypothesis.  
Panel D shows the differences in long-term performance between deals advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. For the full sample, acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors by 15.73% (p = 0.000) 
on average, while median acquirer advised by top-tier advisor outperform median 
acquirer advised by no-top-tier advisor by 19.31% (p = 0.000). In addition, the 
outperformance of acquirers advised by top-tier advisors is also shown in constrained, 
neutral, and unconstrained acquirer subsamples. The results suggest that top-tier 
advisors can help their clients improve performance in the long term. However, 
constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have the best long-term 
performance. 
Deal completion rate, time to resolution, bid premiums, and advisory fees 
Table 5 reports deal completion rate for different constraint–advisor groups and their 
univariate comparison. Regardless of financial conditions and advisor retention status, 
deal completion rates are above 90%. For the sample of deals advised by investment 
banks, the deal completion rate for constrained acquirers is 4.82% (p = 0.000) lower 
than that for unconstrained acquirers. Similarly, for deals advised by top-tier and non-
to-tier advisors, constrained acquirers have significantly lower deal completion rates, 
compared to unconstrained acquirers. In addition, the results suggest top-tier advisors 
do not help acquirers to improve deal completion rate on average. For constrained and 
neutral acquirers, deals advised by top-tier advisors even have lower deal completion 
rate, although the results are insignificant. However, unconstrained acquirers advised 
by top-tier advisors have the highest deal completion rate (95.19%). In contrast, 
constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have the lowest deal completion 
rate (90.09%). These results suggest that unconstrained acquirers retain top-tier 
advisors to pursue deal completion. 
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Insert Table 5 Here 
 
Table 6 reports the time to resolution for different constraint–advisor groups and their 
univariate comparison. Time to resolution is measured as the number of days between 
the announcement and effective dates. Compared with unconstrained acquirers, 
constrained acquirers use 31.17 (p = 0.000) more days to complete deals on average. 
In addition, in deals advised by top-tier advisors and deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors, the time to resolution is significantly longer for constrained acquirers than 
unconstrained acquirers. These results suggest that constrained acquirers are more 
careful in conducting takeovers. Furthermore, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
take 19.72 (p = 0.000) more days to complete deals than acquirers advised by non-
top-tier advisors. For all three different constraint groups, time to resolution is 
significantly higher for acquirers advised by top-tier advisors. If top-tier advisors have 
superior skills, they can take less time to complete deals. On one hand, it is possible 
that top-tier advisors are retained in more complex deals, and therefore they use 
longer time to complete deals. On the other hand, the results may suggest top-tier 
advisors work diligently.  
Insert Table 6 Here 
 
Table 7 shows the bid premiums for different constraint–advisor groups and their 
univariate comparison. Bid premiums, obtained from Thomson One Banker, are 
calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price four 
weeks prior to the announcement divided by the latter term. Following Golubov et al. 
(2012); Officer (2003), we winsorized the variable if values are beyond the range of 
[0, 2]. If acquirers have higher bargaining power, they will pay lower bid premiums. 
For the full sample, constrained acquirers pay significantly lower premiums than 
unconstrained acquirers, indicating that constrained acquirers care more about 
takeover performance than unconstrained acquirers do. On average, acquirers advised 
by top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors do, which suggests that top-tier advisors help their clients gain 
stronger bargaining power in the negotiation process and therefore secure more shares 
of synergy. On average, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay the 
lowest bid premium (38.21%). 
Insert Table 7 Here 
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Table 8 shows the acquirer relative advisory fees for different constraint–advisor 
groups and their univariate comparison. Relative advisory fees are measured as 
acquirer total advisory fees divided by takeover transaction value. It has been shown 
in the summary statistics that top-tier advisors charge premium advisory fees. 
However, if top-tier advisors are retained in complex deals, it is reasonable that top-
tier advisors charge higher advisory fees for deals with higher transaction value. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine relative advisory fees. The results suggest top-
tier advisors charge significantly lower relative advisory fees than non-top-tier 
advisors, which is consistent with the univariate test result in Golubov et al. (2012). In 
other words, acquirers do not overpay top-tier advisors. In addition, it is not surprising 
that constrained acquirers pay significantly lower relative advisory fees than 
unconstrained acquirers do. However, the result is driven by the subsample of deals 
advised by top-tier advisors. For deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, there is no 
significant difference between constrained and unconstrained acquirers.  
Insert Table 8 Here 
 
Overall, for deals with investment banks’ advisory service, constrained acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors gain the highest short- and long-term performance, pay 
the lowest bid premiums and relative advisory fees, and have the lowest deal 
completion rate. In contrast, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have 
the highest deal completion rate, but gain the lowest announcement returns. They also 
gain lower long-term returns, and pay higher bid premiums and relative advisory fees. 
These results suggest that constrained and unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors give priority to takeover performance and deal completion, respectively. In 
other words, constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance, 
whereas unconstrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete their intended 
deals.    
3.2. Multivariate analysis 
We conduct multivariate regressions to further address the research question. 
Specifically, we conduct regressions of short- and long-term abnormal returns on top-
tier advisors for deals advised by investment banks.   
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Short-term performance 
Table 9 shows the results of the short-term multivariate analysis for deals advised by 
investment banks. Specifications 1 and 2 represent the regressions of CAR [-2, 2] on 
top-tier advisors for all acquirers. Specifications 3, 4, and 5 represent the regressions 
for constrained, neutral, and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. 
 
Insert Table 9 Here 
 
The TopTier dummy, the key explanatory variable of this paper, is insignificant in 
specification 1, suggesting that top-tier advisors do not help acquirers to improve 
announcement performance. This result is consistent with the view that bank 
reputation does not have positive effects on acquirer performance (Hunter and 
Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). However, the univariate tests in section 4.1 suggest that the positive effects of 
top-tier advisors are only shown in the subsample of constrained acquirers, and the 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain the highest announcement returns. In other 
words, constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance. To 
examine this proposition, we add two dummy variables for constrained and 
unconstrained acquirers (Constrained dummy and Unconstrained dummy) and 
interact them with the TopTier dummy in specification 2. As a result, we find that the 
interaction between TopTier dummy and Constrained dummy is significantly positive, 
whereas the TopTierUnconstrained interaction is insignificant. The results suggest 
that the effects of top-tier advisors depend on acquirer financial conditions. More 
specifically, top-tier advisors improve their clients’ announcement performance, but 
only for constrained acquirers. These results concur with those of Golubov et al. 
(2012) that prestigious banks provide superior M&A advisory services. The 
Constrained and Unconstrained dummies are insignificant in the specification 2, 
suggesting that financial constraint is not a determinant of acquirer announcement 
performance when firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. In 
addition, the TopTier dummy is significantly positive in the regression of constrained 
acquirer subsample (specification 3), but insignificant in the regressions of neutral and 
unconstrained acquirer subsamples (specifications 4 and 5), which is consistent with 
the result of specification 2.  As can be seen from specification 3, top-tier advisors can 
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help constrained acquirers improve announcement abnormal returns by 1.45%. 
However, for unconstrained and neutral acquirers, the retention of top-tier advisors 
does not enhance announcement performance. These results support the reputation–
quality mechanism; however, the impacts of bank reputation are sensitive to acquirers’ 
financial conditions, which adds new evidence on the service quality of prestigious 
investment banks.    
Furthermore, the variable LN(MV) is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, 
suggesting that larger firms tend to gain lower announcement returns. Moeller et al. 
(2004) examine the effects of firm size on M&A performance, and also find that 
acquirer announcement returns negatively associate with the size of the company. The 
variable Cash Flows/Equity is significantly positive in specifications 1 to 3, indicating 
that acquirers with higher cash flows-to-equity ratio have better short-term 
performance. The variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specifications 1 
and 2, which is consistent with the findings of Fuller et al. (2002) that deals with 
larger relative size create more announcement returns for acquirers. The Public 
dummy is significantly negative in all specifications, implying that acquirers 
underperform in public acquisitions. Similarly, Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) 
show that acquirers gain higher returns in private acquisitions than in public 
acquisitions. The Cash dummy is significantly positive in all specifications, 
suggesting that cash deals have better announcement performance. The Hostile 
dummy is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, indicating that acquirers in 
hostile deals underperform around announcements. The Competing Bid dummy is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 to 4, which is consistent with the conclusion 
of De et al. (1996) that takeover contests have a detrimental influence on acquirer 
announcement returns. The Tender Offer dummy is significantly positive in all 
specifications, implying that acquirers gain higher announcement returns in tender 
offers. The result is in line with Loughran and Vijh (1997), who find that tender offer 
is positively related to acquirer performance. The Diversification dummy is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, suggesting that diversifying deals 
destroy value for acquirers, which is consistent with the previous literature (Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). The Low Valuation Market dummy is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, indicating that acquirers underperform 
around announcements, when the deals are conducted during a “bear” market. 
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Bouwman et al. (2009) examine the difference in acquirer performance between 
acquisitions in “bull” and “bear” markets, and find that acquirers in high-valuation 
markets outperform in the short term compared to acquirers in low-valuation markets. 
Our result is qualitatively similar to that of Bouwman et al. (2009). 
Long-term performance 
Table 10 shows the results of the long-term multivariate analysis for completed deals 
with investment banks’ advisory service. Specifications 1 and 2 represent the 
regressions of BHAR36 on top-tier advisors for all acquirers. Specifications 3, 4, and 
5 represent the regressions for constrained, neutral, and unconstrained acquirers, 
respectively. 
 
Insert Table 10 Here 
 
The coefficient of the TopTier dummy is positive for specification 1 (regression for 
the full sample), suggesting that top-tier advisors improve acquirers’ performance in 
the long term. The result supports the view that prestigious banks have superior skills 
(Golubov et al., 2012). Most studies only examine the effects of bank reputation on 
acquirer short-term performance. This result adds new evidence to the research on the 
reputation–quality mechanism, and highlights the importance of the long-term effects 
of top-tier advisors. However, the TopTier dummy loses its significance in the 
specification 2, when the interactions between top-tier status and financial constraint 
are added in the regression. In particular, the TopTierUnconstrained interaction is 
insignificant, whereas the TopTierConstrained interaction is significantly positive, 
suggesting that top-tier advisors improve their clients’ long-term performance for 
constrained acquirers rather than unconstrained acquirers. In addition to the 
regressions of short-term performance, the result further shows that the effects of top-
tier advisors differ across acquirers with different financial conditions. In addition, 
Constrained and Unconstrained dummies are insignificant in specification 2, 
suggesting that financial constraint has no significant influence on acquirer long-term 
performance when firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. 
Furthermore, the results of subsample regressions are consistent with those of 
specification 2. Specifically, the Top-Tier dummy is significantly positive in 
specification 3 (constrained acquirers) but insignificant for specifications 4 (neutral 
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acquirers) and 5 (unconstrained acquirers). According to specification 3, constrained 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors outperform constrained acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors by 24.27% in the long term. These results suggest that top-tier 
advisors help constrained acquirers gain significantly higher long-term abnormal 
returns, but do not improve performance for unconstrained and neutral acquirers. The 
results again show that the effects of top-tier advisors are sensitive to acquirer 
financial conditions.  
Additionally, the variable LN(MV) is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, 
indicating that larger acquirers underperform in the long term. The variable M/B is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 to 4, which is consistent with Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), who find that glamour acquirers underperform in the long term. 
The variable Leverage is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 3, implying that 
acquirers with higher leverage ratio gain better long-term performance. Similarly, 
Maloney et al. (1993) investigate the relation between capital structure and M&A 
returns. They find that acquirers with higher leverage obtain higher returns, and argue 
that debt helps to alleviate agency problem and therefore improve the quality of M&A 
decision-making. The variable Cash Flows/Equity is significantly positive in 
specifications 1, 2 and 4, indicating that acquirers who have better operating 
performance before acquisitions tend to gain higher long-term returns. Kohers and 
Kohers (2001) analyze takeovers of high-tech firms and find positive relationship 
between pre-deal operating performance and post-deal long-term abnormal returns to 
acquirers. The variable RUNUP is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 4, 
indicating that firms with better stock performance prior to announcements do not 
maintain their performance during the post-merger period. Similarly, Rosen (2006) 
finds that acquirer runup is negatively related to both short- and long-term abnormal 
returns for acquirers. The variable Sigma is significantly negative in specifications 1 
and 2, suggesting that acquirers with higher risk of stocks underperform in the long 
term. The result is consistent with the work of Moeller et al. (2007), which shows 
negative relations between acquirer stock return volatility and acquirer performance. 
The variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specification 5, suggesting that 
acquisitions of relatively larger targets generate higher long-term returns for acquirers. 
The Cash dummy is significantly positive in specification 5, suggesting that acquirers 
outperform in cash deals. Loughran and Vijh (1997) also show that deals paid by cash 
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generate more returns to acquirers in the long term than deals paid by stock. The 
variable Hostile is significantly positive in specifications 1 to 3, indicating that 
acquirers gain higher long-term returns in hostile deals. Schwert (2000) points out that 
hostile takeovers are strategically employed by acquirers or targets to maximize their 
gains. 
 
4. Robustness test 
This section addresses the robustness of our results.15  
Financial advisor classification 
We evaluate whether our results are sensitive to different financial advisor 
classifications. Specifically, we follow the method of Golubov et al. (2012), using the 
top-eight cut-off point.16 In addition, since the investment bank league table is market 
share-based, we also use different thresholds (e.g. 8% and 10%) of market share to 
define top-tier advisors. Furthermore, since the sample period of this research is 
longer than two decades, we also measure bank ranking separately over 1990s and 
post-2000 period. To examine whether the league table is sensitive to the time 
intervals, we also examine the bank ranking over each three-year period. By using 
different definitions of top-tier advisors, our results are not qualitatively changed. 
Measure of financial constraint 
To examine whether our results are sensitive to the measure of financial constraint, we 
also use the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) to classify financial constraints of 
firms. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that firm size and age are the reliable indictors 
of financial constraints and introduce the SA index. Following Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010), we calculate the SA index using the following formula: 
SA          Size         Size          Age  
where Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (inflation adjusted to 2004), and 
Age is the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat. When the SA index is 
                                                                
15 This paper does not tabulate the robustness results for brevity; however, the results are available upon request. 
16 The top-eight investment banks on the market-share based league table are defined as top-tier advisors. 
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calculated, Size is winsorized at (the log of) $4.5 billion, and Age is winsorized at 37 
years.  
Companies with higher SA index, lower age, and larger size are more financially 
constrained. By using SA index, age, and size to measure financial constraint, our 
results are qualitatively similar.  
Short-term performance 
We use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer short-
term performance. Specifically, we calculate CARs over the [-1, 1] and [-5, 5] 
windows. In addition, we apply the market model, the Fama-French three-factor 
model, and the Fama-French-momentum four-factor model to compute announcement 
abnormal returns. The results are not sensitive to these variations.  
Long-term performance 
We also use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer 
long-term performance. Specifically, we calculate BHARs over 12-month and 24-
month windows. In addition, we calculate market-adjusted BHARs. For size-adjusted 
BHARs, we also use following alternative formula: 
     ,𝑇1,𝑇2  ∏       
𝑇2
 =𝑇1
       
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and Rpt is the monthly buy-
and-hold return for the reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
    ∑
∏        
𝑇 
 =𝑇1   
 
 
 = 
 
with Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and n the number of firms.  
The results are robust to these variations.  
Other issues 
To control for the influence of outliers, we also winsorize all the quantitative variables 
at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. In addition, 
bid premium is measured as the difference between offer price and target price four 
weeks prior to the announcement divided by the latter term. To calculate bid 
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premiums, we also measure target prices one week and one day before the 
announcement. We also use a binary classification to distinguish between constrained 
and unconstrained acquirers. Specifically, the highest third of acquirers ranked by KZ 
index are defined as constrained, and the others are defined as unconstrained 
acquirers. However, the results are not sensitive to the above variations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether top-tier investment bankers can help acquirers gain 
superior takeover performance in both the short and long term and, more importantly, 
whether the effects of top-tier advisors are dependent on acquirer financial 
constraints. In line with Malmendier and Tate (2008) that financially unconstrained 
acquirers tend to be overconfident and therefore make value-decreasing takeovers, 
this paper show that the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer performance, 
but only for constrained acquirers. Specifically, in the short term, retaining top-tier 
advisors can help constrained acquirers improve announcement abnormal returns by 
1.45%, after controlling for firm, deal, and market characteristics. However, the 
retention of top-tier advisors does not improve short-term performance for 
unconstrained and neutral acquirers. In the long term, the retention of top-tier advisors 
is positively related to acquirer performance. The result is driven by the sub-sample of 
constrained acquirers. For constrained acquirers, the retention of top-tier advisors 
improves long-term performance by 24.27%, after firm, deal, and market 
characteristics are controlled for. In contrast, the effects of top-tier advisors are 
insignificant for unconstrained and neutral acquirers. Therefore, the results indicate 
that the effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer performance differ across acquirers 
with different levels of financial constraints. The retention of top-tier advisors creates 
value for relatively constrained acquirers in both the short and long term.  
Acquirers choose appropriate investment bankers to conduct M&A deals. 
Correspondingly, financial advisors also have rights and opportunities to determine 
whether they accept the offers. Since top-tier advisors tend to be in high demand, 
there is concern that top-tier advisors select their acquirer clients to maintain their 
reputation. In other words, it is possible that top-tier advisors cherry-pick acquirer 
clients with given characteristics to generate excess returns. However, empirical 
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evidence suggests this concern is not necessary. Firstly, acquirer firm characteristics 
are not the only determinant to gain superior performance. To create synergy, it is 
essential to choose appropriate targets. Golubov et al. (2012) have highlighted the top-
tier advisors’ abilities to identify synergistic targets and to secure more shares of 
synergy for their clients. Secondly, our results suggest that financial constraint is not a 
significant determinant for acquirer performance, when firm, deal, and market 
characteristics are controlled for. If top-tier advisors cherry-pick acquirer clients to 
gain superior performance and maintain their reputation, it cannot explain the fact that 
top-tier advisors improve performance for constrained acquirers, but not for 
unconstrained acquirers.      
In addition, the results for deal completion rate, bid premiums, and acquirer relative 
advisory fees can help explain the variation in acquirer performance. In general, deal 
completion is independent of bank reputation. Top-tier advisors should have stronger 
ability to complete deals. It is possible that top-tier advisors emphasize on deal 
quality, and deter value-destroying deals for their clients. However, for deals with 
investment bank involvement, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have 
lowest deal completion rate, whereas unconstrained acquirers with top-tier advisors 
have the highest completion rate. Furthermore, constrained acquirers advised by top-
tier advisors also pay lowest bid premiums and relative advisory fees. In contrast, 
unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay higher advisory fees. If 
unconstrained acquirers chase performance, they should expect to gain higher 
bargaining power and therefore pay lower bid premiums. However, the highest 
advisory fees do not translate into greater bargaining power in the negotiation process. 
Unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay higher bid premiums. These 
results suggest that unconstrained acquirers care less about overpayment and takeover 
performance, and give priority to deal completion. 
Overall, our results suggest that different acquirers have different aims. Constrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to gain superior performance, while unconstrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete their intended deals.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample of M&A Deals, stratified by the retention of financial advisors. The top-tier, non-top-tier and in-
house subsamples contain deals advised by top-tier advisors, deals advised by non-top-tier advisors and in-house deals, respectively. Panels A, B, C and D 
reports acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns, acquirer firm characteristics, deal characteristics, and market characteristics, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Bid Premiums are winsorized if values are beyond the range of [0, 2]. Other quantitative variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. T-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the difference in mean and median, respectively. 
 
 All  Top-Tier  Non-Top-Tier  In-House  Difference 
 (A)  (T)  (N)  (I)  (T) – (N) 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 P-Value 
Mean 
P-Value 
Median 
Panel A: Acquirer Short- and Long-Term Abnormal Returns  
CAR [-2, 2] 1.08% 0.10 3,420  0.57% 0.48% 1647  1.51% 0.99% 1676  2.42% 0.68% 97  0.003 0.019 
BHAR36 -37.25% 0.84 3,216  -29.68% -35.69% 1572  -44.86% -54.79% 1551  -38.46% -45.98% 93  0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Acquirer Firm Characteristics  
KZ Index -14.61 52.37 3,420  -11.67 -2.25 1647  -18.12 -2.75 1676  -3.83 -1.28 97  0.000 0.010 
MV ($ mil) 8239.88 23159.14 3,420  12944.36 2496.40 1647  2425.14 388.54 1676  28829.64 1602.12 97  0.000 0.000 
M/B 4.84 6.80 3,420  4.86 3.02 1647  4.64 2.76 1676  7.97 5.00 97  0.181 0.004 
Leverage 0.28 0.26 3,420  0.31 0.30 1647  0.24 0.15 1676  0.25 0.24 97  0.000 0.000 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.04 0.13 3,420  0.06 0.06 1647  0.03 0.05 1676  0.04 0.05 97  0.000 0.000 
RUNUP 0.17 0.49 3,420  0.15 0.10 1647  0.20 0.11 1676  0.15 0.12 97  0.005 0.093 
Sigma 0.03 0.02 3,420  0.03 0.02 1647  0.04 0.03 1676  0.03 0.03 97  0.000 0.000 
Past Experience 6.94 8.53 3,420  8.57 6.00 1647  4.90 3.00 1676  14.67 8.00 97  0.000 0.000 
Serial Bidder 28.74% 0.45 3,420  37.40% – 1647  18.79% – 1676  53.61% – 97  0.000 – 
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 All  Top-Tier  Non-Top-Tier  In-House  Difference 
 (A)  (T)  (N)  (I)  (T) – (N) 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 P-Value 
Mean 
P-Value 
Median 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 728.25 1823.83 3,420  1207.49 365.35 1647  275.16 69.69 1676  419.63 101.13 97  0.000 0.000 
Relative Size 0.34 0.45 3,420  0.33 0.17 1647  0.36 0.19 1676  0.10 0.05 97  0.037 0.001 
Public 46.20% 0.50 3,420  53.79% – 1647  36.63% – 1676  82.47% – 97  0.000 – 
All Stock Deals 25.50% 0.44 3,420  20.40% – 1647  29.18% – 1676  48.45% – 97  0.000 – 
All Cash Deals 37.08% 0.48 3,420  42.38% – 1647  32.10% – 1676  32.99% – 97  0.000 – 
Mix Deals 37.43% 0.48 3,420  37.22% – 1647  38.72% – 1676  18.56% – 97  0.186 – 
Hostile 2.63% 0.16 3,420  3.89% – 1647  1.55% – 1676  0.00% – 97  0.000 – 
Competing Bid 3.19% 0.18 3,420  4.31% – 1647  2.15% – 1676  2.06% – 97  0.000 – 
Tender Offer 16.20% 0.37 3,420  19.73% – 1647  12.47% – 1676  20.62% – 97  0.000 – 
Diversification 34.82% 0.48 3,420  34.43% – 1647  34.90% – 1676  40.21% – 97  0.386 – 
Completed Deals 92.98% 0.26 3,420  92.53% – 1647  93.38% – 1676  93.81% – 97  0.171 – 
Time to Resolution 86.02 78.92 3,386  95.23 73.00 1635  75.51 54.00 1658  111.39 98.00 93  0.000 0.000 
Bid Premiums 42.61% 0.38 1,456  40.62% 33.33% 839  43.84% 35.04% 546  56.76% 45.45% 71  0.061 0.295 
Advisory Fees ($ mil) 3.89 6.45 537  6.21 3.23 256  1.77 0.75 281  – – –  0.000 0.000 
Relative Advisory Fees 0.85% 0.85% 537  0.69% 0.51% 256  0.99% 0.75% 281  – – –  0.000 0.000 
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
Heat Degree 1.45 0.34 3,420  1.40 1.36 1647  1.47 1.44 1676  1.82 1.85 97  0.000 0.000 
High Valuation Market 44.06% 0.50 3,420  39.28% – 1647  46.00% – 1676  91.75% – 97  0.000 – 
Neutral Valuation Market 38.77% 0.49 3,420  41.23% – 1647  38.37% – 1676  4.12% – 97  0.046 – 
Low Valuation Market 17.16% 0.38 3,420  19.49% – 1647  15.63% – 1676  4.12% – 97  0.002 – 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 31 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents pairwise correlations of the variables. Variables are abbreviated as follows: CAR – CAR [-2, 2]; BHAR – BHAR36; Top – Top-Tier 
Advisor; KZ – KZ Index; MV – Market Value; MB – M/B; LEV – Leverage; CFE – Cash Flows/Equity; RUN – RUNUP; SIG – Sigma; PE – Past 
Experience; SB – Serial Bidder; RS – Relative Size; PUB – Public; STO – Stock; CAS – Cash; HOS – Hostile; CB – Competing Bid; TO – Tender Offer; 
DIV – Diversification; HD – Heat Degree; HVM – High Valuation Market; LVM – Low Valuation Market. All variables are defined in Section 3.2 and 
Appendix B. Bid Premiums are winsorized if values are beyond the range of [0, 2]. Other quantitative variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
  CAR BHAR TOP KZ MV MB LEV CFE RUN SIG PE SB RS PUB STO CAS HOS CB TO DIV HD HVM LVM 
CAR 1.00 
                      
BHAR -0.01 1.00 
                     
TOP -0.05 0.09 1.00 
                    
KZ 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.00 
                   
MV -0.07 0.01 0.19 0.04 1.00 
                  
MB -0.03 -0.16 0.00 -0.18 0.18 1.00 
                 
LEV 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.03 -0.06 1.00 
                
CFE 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.03 -0.11 0.16 1.00 
               
RUN -0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.46 -0.08 -0.04 1.00 
              
SIG 0.00 -0.15 -0.28 -0.29 -0.22 0.24 -0.19 -0.35 0.32 1.00 
             
PE -0.07 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.56 0.01 0.13 0.07 -0.06 -0.25 1.00 
            
SB -0.05 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.33 -0.02 0.11 0.08 -0.08 -0.27 0.67 1.00 
           
RS 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.18 -0.14 0.19 0.05 -0.06 0.11 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 
          
PUB -0.14 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.13 0.17 0.14 0.08 1.00 
         
STO -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 0.00 0.27 -0.13 -0.18 0.22 0.32 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.14 1.00 
        
CAS 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.15 0.03 0.15 -0.16 -0.30 0.12 0.13 -0.18 0.02 -0.44 1.00 
       
HOS -0.06 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.16 -0.05 0.01 1.00 
      
CB -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.31 1.00 
     
TO 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.08 -0.11 -0.14 0.09 0.09 -0.04 0.46 -0.20 0.33 0.16 0.14 1.00 
    
DIV -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.10 0.07 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 1.00 
   
HD 0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.25 -0.17 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 1.00 
  
HVM 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.23 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.60 1.00 
 
LVM -0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.10 -0.19 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.29 -0.40 1.00 
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Table 3: Acquirer Short-Term Performance 
 
This table reports acquirer short-term 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement for the sample of deals advised by investment banks. The variable 
is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are divided into three groups based on 
KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their KZ index are 
defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers are classified 
as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B relates to deals advised 
by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Panel D relates 
to difference in acquirer performance between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors. The variable (CAR [-2, 2]) is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. T-test is used to 
test the significance of the mean, and the difference in the means. Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the significance of median and the difference in 
medians, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 1.04%
***
 1.90%
***
 0.84%
***
 0.41% 1.49%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.204) (0.000) 
Median 0.64%
***
 1.42%
***
 0.49%
***
 0.26% 1.16%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.303) (0.000) 
N 3,323 1,098 1,108 1,117 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 0.57%
***
 2.31%
***
 0.18% -0.88%
**
 3.19%
***
 
 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.549) (0.042) (0.000) 
Median 0.48%
***
 1.82%
***
 0.21% -0.24%
**
 2.06%
***
 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.529) (0.049) (0.000) 
N 1,647 545 603 499 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 1.51%
***
 1.49%
***
 1.61%
***
 1.45%
***
 0.04% 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.474) 
Median 0.99%
***
 1.28%
***
 0.91%
***
 0.69%
***
 0.59% 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.830) 
N 1,676 553 505 618 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean -0.94%
***
 0.83%
*
 -1.43%
***
 -2.33%
***
 
 
 
(0.003) (0.073) (0.004) (0.000) 
 
Median -0.51%
**
 0.54% -0.70%
**
 -0.93%
***
 
 
 
(0.019) (0.125) (0.029) (0.000) 
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Table 4: Acquirer Long-Term Performance 
 
This table reports the acquirer long-term 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns from the announcement for the sample of completed deals advised by investment 
banks. The variable is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are divided into 
three groups based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked 
by their KZ index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of 
acquirers are classified as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B 
relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors. Panel D relates to difference in acquirer performance between deals advised by top-
tier and non-top-tier advisors. The variable (BHAR36) is winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic is used to test the significance of the 
mean. T-test is used to test the significance of the difference in the means. Wilcoxon signed-
rank test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the significance of median and the 
difference in medians, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) - (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean -37.19%
***
 -29.97%
***
 -38.82%
***
 -42.41%
***
 12.44%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Median -44.97%
***
 -39.85%
***
 -42.44%
***
 -53.05%
***
 13.20%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2,920 940 983 997  
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean -29.35%
***
 -16.69%
***
 -36.31%
***
 -33.82%
***
 17.12%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Median -35.69%
***
 -29.65%
***
 -34.75%
***
 -45.84%
***
 16.19%
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
N 1,464 461 543 460 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean -45.08%
***
 -42.75%
***
 -41.91%
***
 -49.77%
***
 7.02% 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) 
Median -55.00%
***
 -55.29%
***
 -49.42%
***
 -60.19%
***
 4.91%
*
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) 
N 1,456 479 440 537 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean 15.73%
***
 26.05%
***
 5.60% 15.95%
***
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.002) 
 
Median 19.31%
***
 25.63%
***
 14.67%
***
 14.35%
***
 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)   
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Table 5: Deal Completion Rate 
 
This table reports the deal completion rate for the sample of deals advised by investment 
banks. The variable is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are divided into 
three groups based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked 
by their KZ index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of 
acquirers are classified as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B 
relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors. Panel D relates to difference in deal completion rate between deals advised by top-
tier and non-top-tier advisors. T-test is used to test the significance of the mean, and the 
difference in the means. P-Values are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) - (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 92.96% 90.35% 93.32% 95.17% -4.82%
***
 
 
    (0.000) 
N 3,323 1,098 1,108 1,117 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 92.53% 90.09% 92.54% 95.19% -5.10%
***
 
     
(0.001) 
N 1,647 545 603 499 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 93.38% 90.60% 94.26% 95.15% -4.55%
***
 
     
(0.001) 
N 1,676 553 505 618 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean -0.85% -0.51% -1.72% 0.04% 
 
  (0.171) (0.389) (0.124) (0.486)   
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Table 6: Time to Resolution 
 
This table reports time to resolution for the sample of deals advised by investment banks. The 
variable is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are divided into three groups 
based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their KZ 
index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers are 
classified as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B relates to 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
Panel D relates to difference in time to resolution between deals advised by top-tier and non-
top-tier advisors. The variable (Time to Resolution) is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
T-test is used to test the significance of the mean, and the difference in the means. Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the significance of median and 
the difference in medians, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) - (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 85.30 101.05 85.30 69.87 31.17
***
 
     
(0.000) 
Median 64.00 79.00 63.00 50.50 28.50
***
 
     
(0.000) 
N 3,293 1,084 1,103 1,106 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 95.23 108.08 95.95 80.43 27.65
***
 
    
 
(0.000) 
Median 73.00 83.00 73.00 63.00 20.00
***
 
    
 
(0.000) 
N 1,635 538 601 496 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 75.51 94.12 72.55 61.29 32.83
***
 
     
(0.000) 
Median 54.00 73.00 49.00 42.00 31.00
***
 
     
(0.000) 
N 1,658 546 502 610 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean 19.72
***
 13.96
***
 23.40
***
 19.14
***
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Median 19.00
***
 10.00
***
 24.00
***
 21.00
***
 
 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)   
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 Table 7: Bid Premium 
 
This table reports the bid premium for the sample of public deals advised by investment banks. 
The variable is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are divided into three 
groups based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their 
KZ index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers 
are classified as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B relates to 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
Panel D relates to difference in bid premium between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-
tier advisors. The variable (Bid Premium) is winsorized if values are beyond the range of [0, 
2]. T-test is used to test the significance of the mean, and the difference in the means. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the significance of 
median and the difference in medians, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) - (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 41.89% 39.65% 41.39% 45.44% -5.78%
**
 
     
(0.012) 
Median 33.93% 33.37% 32.92% 36.73% -3.36%
*
 
     
(0.071) 
N 1,385 499 501 385 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 40.62% 38.21% 38.46% 46.58% -8.37%
***
 
     
(0.005) 
Median 33.33% 32.40% 31.29% 38.10% -5.70%
**
 
     
(0.018) 
N 839 283 324 232 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 43.84% 41.54% 46.76% 43.71% -2.17% 
     
(0.299) 
Median 35.05% 35.28% 35.42% 34.45% 0.83% 
     
(0.961) 
N 546 216 177 153 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean -3.22%
*
 -3.33% -8.31%
**
 2.87% 
 
 
(0.061) (0.141) (0.012) (0.249) 
 
Median -1.72% -2.88% -4.13%
*
 3.65% 
 
  (0.295) (0.359) (0.065) (0.282)   
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Table 8: Acquirer Relative Advisory Fees 
 
This table reports the acquirer relative advisory fees for the sample of deals advised by 
investment banks. The variable is defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Acquirers are 
divided into three groups based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of 
acquirers ranked by their KZ index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The 
middle third of acquirers are classified as neutral acquirers. Panel A relates to all deals in the 
sample. Panel B relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised 
by non-top-tier advisors. Panel D relates to difference in acquirer relative advisory fees 
between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. The variable (Acquirer Relative 
Advisory Fees) is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. T-test is used to test the significance 
of the mean, and the difference in the means. Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Wilcoxon rank-
sum test are used to test the significance of median and the difference in medians, 
respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained Difference 
  (A) (C) (N) (U) (C) - (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 0.85% 0.77% 0.90% 0.91% -0.14%
*
 
     
(0.068) 
Median 0.61% 0.53% 0.69% 0.64% -0.11%
**
 
     
(0.031) 
N 537 224 180 133 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 0.69% 0.62% 0.72% 0.77% -0.15%
*
 
   
 
 
(0.089) 
Median 0.51% 0.43% 0.56% 0.54% -0.12% 
   
 
 
(0.109) 
N 256 104 95 57 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 0.99% 0.89% 1.09% 1.01% -0.12% 
     
(0.205) 
Median 0.75% 0.63% 0.87% 0.70% -0.06% 
     
(0.221) 
N 281 120 85 76 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Mean -0.30%
***
 -0.28%
***
 -0.37%
***
 -0.24%
*
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.051) 
 
Median -0.23%
***
 -0.21%
**
 -0.31%
***
 -0.15% 
 
  (0.000) (0.028) (0.001) (0.187)   
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Table 9: Regression of Short-Term Performance 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of short-term performance for the sample of 
deals advised by investment banks. In these models acquirer CAR [-2, 2] are regressed 
against a vector of explanatory variables. Acquirers are divided into three groups based on KZ 
index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their KZ index are 
defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers are classified 
as neutral acquirers. Specifications 1 and 2 report the results for all acquirers. Specifications 
3, 4 and 5 report the results for constrained, neutral and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. In all models, industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the 
table. All quantitative variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained 
TopTier 0.0004 -0.0033 0.0145
**
 -0.0043 -0.0125 
 
(0.910) (0.565) (0.024) (0.464) (0.118) 
TopTierConstrained 
 
0.0180
**
 
   
  
(0.022) 
   
TopTierUnconstrained 
 
-0.0077 
   
  
(0.369) 
   
Constrained 
 
-0.0061 
   
  
(0.325) 
   
Unconstrained 
 
0.0032 
   
  
(0.637) 
   
Ln(MV) -0.0054
***
 -0.0051
***
 -0.0092
***
 -0.0035 -0.0048 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.131) (0.108) 
M/B 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0011 
 
(0.385) (0.314) (0.479) (0.829) (0.173) 
Leverage 0.0050 0.0039 0.0067 -0.0046 0.0050 
 
(0.495) (0.619) (0.576) (0.735) (0.753) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0411
**
 0.0390
**
 0.0536
**
 0.0043 0.0305 
 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.934) (0.301) 
RUNUP 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0060 -0.0062 
 
(0.755) (0.762) (0.849) (0.528) (0.447) 
Sigma 0.0301 0.0303 -0.2624 -0.0720 0.0520 
 
(0.870) (0.869) (0.356) (0.856) (0.873) 
Past Experience -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0006 
 
(0.962) (0.989) (0.807) (0.406) (0.282) 
Serial Bidder 0.0015 0.0017 0.0018 -0.0003 0.0031 
 
(0.755) (0.732) (0.849) (0.969) (0.727) 
Relative Size 0.0110
*
 0.0112
*
 0.0094 0.0051 0.0180 
 
(0.055) (0.052) (0.222) (0.647) (0.180) 
Public -0.0322
***
 -0.0322
***
 -0.0234
***
 -0.0306
***
 -0.0424
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.0155
***
 0.0155
***
 0.0166
***
 0.0133
**
 0.0156
**
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.042) (0.040) 
Stock -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0059 0.0071 -0.0092 
 
(0.553) (0.591) (0.516) (0.399) (0.355) 
Hostile -0.0211
**
 -0.0232
***
 -0.0225
*
 -0.0176 -0.0187 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.089) (0.234) (0.209) 
Competing Bid -0.0293
***
 -0.0291
***
 -0.0419
***
 -0.0248
**
 -0.0036 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.026) (0.802) 
Tender Offer 0.0299
***
 0.0303
***
 0.0220
***
 0.0333
***
 0.0378
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0070
*
 -0.0063
*
 -0.0126
*
 -0.0023 -0.0062 
 
(0.056) (0.084) (0.069) (0.662) (0.395) 
M&A Heat Degree -0.0317 -0.0299 -0.0760 0.0181 -0.0392 
 
(0.349) (0.375) (0.203) (0.749) (0.532) 
High Valuation Market -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0136 -0.0113 -0.0061 
 
(0.988) (0.971) (0.322) (0.291) (0.712) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0113
**
 -0.0111
**
 -0.0173
*
 -0.0064 -0.0089 
 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.087) (0.478) (0.392) 
Constant 0.0840
**
 0.0803
**
 0.1953
***
 0.0429 0.0581 
 
(0.028) (0.037) (0.005) (0.500) (0.404) 
N 3323 3323 1098 1108 1117 
R
2
 0.087 0.090 0.144 0.087 0.097 
adj. R
2
 0.072 0.074 0.101 0.042 0.053 
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Table 10: Regression of Long-Term Performance 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of long-term performance for the sample of 
completed deals advised by investment banks. In these models acquirer BHAR36 are 
regressed against a vector of explanatory variables. Acquirers are divided into three groups 
based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their KZ 
index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers are 
classified as neutral acquirers. Specifications 1 and 2 report the results for all acquirers. 
Specifications 3, 4 and 5 report the results for constrained, neutral and unconstrained 
acquirers, respectively. All variables are defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. In all models, 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients 
are not reported in the table. All quantitative variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained 
TopTier 0.1285
***
 0.0550 0.2427
***
 0.0476 0.0856 
 
(0.002) (0.327) (0.001) (0.413) (0.258) 
TopTierConstrained 
 
0.1434
*
 
   
  
(0.068) 
   
TopTierUnconstrained 
 
0.0773 
   
  
(0.390) 
   
Constrained 
 
-0.0385 
   
  
(0.516) 
   
Unconstrained 
 
-0.0075 
   
  
(0.907) 
   
Ln(MV) -0.0422
***
 -0.0410
**
 -0.0730
**
 -0.0387 -0.0138 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.109) (0.650) 
M/B -0.0089
**
 -0.0089
**
 -0.0134
**
 -0.0131
***
 -0.0023 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.690) 
Leverage 0.1359
*
 0.1314 0.2677
**
 0.0239 0.1452 
 
(0.097) (0.119) (0.050) (0.860) (0.310) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.3955
**
 0.3828
**
 0.2071 1.0459
**
 0.1198 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.367) (0.017) (0.712) 
RUNUP -0.0799
*
 -0.0799
*
 -0.1492
*
 -0.1410
*
 0.0269 
 
(0.090) (0.093) (0.069) (0.074) (0.762) 
Sigma -3.2933
*
 -3.3351
*
 -4.5580 -3.9383 -0.2789 
 
(0.087) (0.083) (0.176) (0.223) (0.945) 
Past Experience 0.0048 0.0049 0.0011 0.0034 0.0067 
 
(0.145) (0.140) (0.846) (0.390) (0.334) 
Serial Bidder -0.0168 -0.0128 -0.0891 0.0112 0.0877 
 
(0.752) (0.808) (0.295) (0.874) (0.405) 
Relative Size 0.0716 0.0698 -0.0512 0.0234 0.4169
***
 
 
(0.170) (0.181) (0.508) (0.788) (0.001) 
Public 0.0063 0.0074 0.0923 -0.0653 -0.0514 
 
(0.871) (0.850) (0.205) (0.259) (0.454) 
Cash 0.0551 0.0543 0.0430 -0.0434 0.1827
***
 
 
(0.124) (0.132) (0.533) (0.436) (0.004) 
Stock -0.0512 -0.0527 -0.0763 -0.0763 -0.0497 
 
(0.336) (0.322) (0.387) (0.319) (0.648) 
Hostile 0.3791
**
 0.3680
**
 0.3799
*
 0.1494 0.4690 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.081) (0.618) (0.298) 
Competing Bid -0.0585 -0.0538 -0.0710 -0.0144 0.0256 
 
(0.587) (0.621) (0.746) (0.932) (0.904) 
Tender Offer 0.0139 0.0145 0.0410 0.0095 0.0111 
 
(0.783) (0.774) (0.661) (0.901) (0.908) 
Diversification -0.0510 -0.0459 0.0086 -0.0279 -0.0751 
 
(0.165) (0.214) (0.902) (0.585) (0.219) 
M&A Heat Degree 0.0414 0.0506 -0.2902 0.0558 0.1705 
 
(0.889) (0.865) (0.602) (0.917) (0.732) 
High Valuation Market -0.0388 -0.0358 0.0491 -0.0451 -0.1333 
 
(0.561) (0.590) (0.663) (0.660) (0.340) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0534 0.0547 0.0835 0.0362 0.0459 
 
(0.313) (0.301) (0.478) (0.666) (0.533) 
Constant -0.1033 -0.1025 0.5316 -0.0316 -0.7544 
 
(0.772) (0.775) (0.478) (0.960) (0.144) 
N 2920 2920 940 983 997 
R
2
 0.091 0.093 0.146 0.139 0.133 
adj. R
2
 0.074 0.074 0.095 0.090 0.086 
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Appendix 1: Top 25 U.S. Financial Advisor Ranking Based on Transaction Value 
 
The table presents the ranking of the top-25 investment banker based on the transaction value 
for acquisitions of U.S. targets over the period January 1990 to December 31, 2012 obtained 
from the Thomson One Banker. Transaction value is shown in U.S. million dollars.  
 
Rank Financial Advisor 
Deal Value 
($ Mil) 
Market 
Share
17
 
Number 
of Deals 
 Top-Tier    
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 7,703,438.25 36.7 4,172 
2 Morgan Stanley 5,939,139.94 28.3 3,328 
3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 5,606,400.70 26.7 4,967 
4 JP Morgan 5,548,980.32 26.4 4,278 
5 Citi/Salomon Smith Barney/Salomon Brothers 4,549,572.86 21.6 3,782 
6 Credit Suisse/First Boston 4,178,196.93 19.9 4,454 
7 Barclays/Lehman Brothers 3,509,500.37 16.7 2,418 
8 UBS 2,266,358.97 10.8 2,424 
9 Lazard 2,170,142.34 10.3 1,887 
10 Deutsche Bank 1,697,296.66 8.1 1,927 
 Non-Top-Tier    
11 Evercore Partners 1,072,961.26 5.1 363 
12 Commerzbank AG 595,289.46 2.8 503 
13 Houlihan Lokey 579,540.88 2.8 2,289 
14 PJT Partners LP 531,198.92 2.5 404 
15 Wells Fargo & Co 530,559.69 2.5 935 
16 Rothschild & Co 478,220.18 2.3 485 
17 Greenhill & Co, LLC 461,694.01 2.2 240 
18 Jefferies LLC 395,867.31 1.9 1,755 
19 Stifel/KBW 371,546.54 1.8 1,535 
20 Allen & Co Inc 306,787.79 1.5 158 
21 Centerview Partners LLC 286,985.04 1.4 80 
22 RBC Capital Markets 263,252.55 1.3 1,496 
23 Moelis & Co 252,028.19 1.2 277 
24 Gleacher & Co Inc 243,717.81 1.2 169 
25 BNP Paribas SA 218,766.09 1.0 78 
 
                                                                
17
 Sum of market share is higher than 100%, which is due to the allocation method used in Thomson One Mergers 
and Acquisitions database. The default allocation method is full credit to each eligible advisor, meaning if multiple 
advisors work on a deal, all of them will receive league table credit for the given transaction. 
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Appendix 2: Definitions of Variables 
 
This table describes variables in this paper. Panel A, B, C and D present acquirer performance, 
firm characteristics, deal characteristics and market characteristics, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Acquirer Short- and Long-Term Abnormal Returns  
CAR [-2, 2] 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return around announcement 
BHAR36 Post-merger 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return 
Panel B: Acquirer Firm Characteristics 
KZ Index Kaplan–Zingales index 
MV Market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT) 
Ln(MV) The logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the 
announcement 
M/B 
 
Market-to-book ratio measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value of equity at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ) 
Leverage 
 
Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement 
(Compustat item (DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)) 
Cash Flows/Equity 
 
Cash flows-to-equity ratio measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before 
the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by market value 
of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) 
RUNUP Acquirer market-adjusted CARs over the pre-announcement [-365, -28] window 
Sigma Standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal returns over the 
pre-announcement [-365, -28] window 
Past Experience Number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the 
acquisition in question 
Serial Bidder 
 
Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer has conducted 5 or more M&A deals 
over the three-year period before the acquisition in question 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value Transaction value of the M&A deal (from Thomson One Banker) 
Relative Size 
 
Transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement 
Public Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Mix Dummy variable equals one if the deals is  
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or 
unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by 
Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer by Thomson 
One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-
digit of the primary SIC code. 
Completed Deals Dummy variable equals one if the deal is successfully completed. 
Time to Resolution Number of days between announcement date and resolution date (effective or 
withdrawn). 
Bid Premiums Difference between the offer price and the target stock price 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by the latter (from Thomson One Banker) 
Advisory Fees Acquirer total advisory fees (from Thomson One Banker) 
Relative Advisory Fees Acquirer total advisory fees divided by transaction value  
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 
 
The moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the 
historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going 
back to 1985. 
High Valuation Market Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in high valuation month. To measure 
stock market valuation, this paper follows the method of Bouwman, Fuller, and 
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Nain (2009). Specifically, this paper initially detrend the monthly P/E ratios of 
the S&P 500 from 1985 to 2009. Subsequently, each month is classified as below 
or above average base on whether the detrended P/E ratio of the month is lower or 
higher than the past five-year average. Finally, the lowest 50% of below average 
months are identified as “Low Valuation Market”, while the highest 50% of 
above average months are identified as “High Valuation Market”. Other month 
are defined as “Neutral valuation Market”. The monthly P/E ratios of the S&P 
500 are acquired from Datastream. 
Neutral Valuation Market  Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in neutral valuation month. 
Low Valuation Market Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in low valuation month. 
 
 
 
 
